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Abstract
This paper sheds new light on the causes of the unemployment upsurge in Japan
during the “fading 1990s”, an unprecedented period of structural crisis. We estimate
a labor market model and identify the main macroeconomic determinants of labor
demand and labor supply decisions in last decades. We then conduct dynamic simu-
lations and assess the relative contribution of these determinants to the evolution of
unemployment from 1990 to 2002. Beyond the leading role exerted by the decline in
productivity growth, we find the active and expansionary measures undertaken by the
government had an overall negative eﬀect on the labor market.
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1 Introduction
What are the forces behind the sudden and prominent unemployment rise in Japan during
the 1990s? Are there some distinguishing features, inherent to the Japanese labor market,
which might account for its odd dynamics? Is the Japanese experience helpful to prevent
a recession of this sort in other East Asian economies? These are important questions that
need to be answered, and this paper intends to be a step in that direction.
The “lost decade” merited a revival in the international interest for Japan. Its labor
market, though, seems to have been left as a too particular case and has received less
attention from mainstream studies. Our analysis tries to fulfill this void and shed new light
on the driving forces of the unemployment upsurge during the fading 1990s.
To study the Japanese labor market we take the viewpoint of the Chain Reaction theory
(CRT) of unemployment, which is an alternative to the Structuralist and Institutionalist
approaches1 and, as explained in Section 2, provides a wider analytical perspective of the la-
bor market. For example, beyond shocks and institutions as main causes of unemployment,
it also considers the role of growth drivers (variables such as capital accumulation, produc-
tivity, or working-age population) in determining the labor market performance. Moreover,
it does not rely on the existence of a natural (or non-accelerating inflation) rate of unem-
ployment as the key analytical variable, which has already been found scarcely relevant in
Japan and kept apart from the policy debate (see Nishizaki, 1997, and Hirose and Kamada,
2002).
We believe the specificities of the Japanese labor market require such a wider perspective
as well as the inclusion of macroeconomic variables the existing literature has already found
relevant. For example, the decline in productivity (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002, and Fukao,
2006), the explosion in the government debt (Barseghyan, 2006a), the rising long-term debt
of firms in terms of their assets (Ogawa, 2003), or the demographic behavior and the aging
population problem (Koga, 2006). These and other more specific labor market variables are
considered in the estimation of a three-equation dynamic system comprising employment,
labor supply, and the rate of unemployment as endogenous variables.
Our analysis leaves aside potential monetary causes of unemployment which have been
substantiated in several studies to explain the Japanese slump.2 The shared idea is that
Japan has since long fallen into a liquidity trap from which the only way out seems to be an
unorthodox monetary policy targeting high levels of inflation. In contrast to these studies,
our analysis is based on a real labor market model where nominal variables play no role.
The contribution of the paper is thus twofold. First, the estimation of a time-series
multi-equation model covering the last decades, with which we conduct a comprehensive
1See Karanassou et al. (2006 and 2007) for contributions on the CRT; Phelps (1994) and Phelps and
Zoega (2001) on the Structuralist theory; and Nickell et al. (2005) on the Institutionalist approach.
2Krugman (1998), Svensson (2001), Hamada (2004), and Braun and Waki (2006).
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macroeconomic analysis of the Japanese labor market from 1990 to 2002. In these years
unemployment rose from 2.1% to a historical maximum of 5.5%. Second, the consideration
of labor market variables, together with other macroeconomic variables examined in the
literature, to assess their relative contributions in explaining the evolution of unemployment
in those years. Some of these variables noticeably shifted from their previous paths and
produced a new outcome on employment performance that, so far, has not been put to test.
The main result of the paper is the extremely influential role played by the decline in
the growth rate of productivity and the overwhelming increase in government debt. These
two, but specially the first one, appear as the driving forces of the rise in unemployment
in Japan during the 1990s. On productivity growth it is still dubious what mechanisms
made it perform so poorly in comparison to previous experience. Nevertheless, various
hypotheses are discussed. On the other hand, the government debt owes its unrelenting
pace to the unholy alliance between government, banks, and firms in the private sector that
has characterized the economy since the postwar.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized labor market
model to characterize our analytical approach. Section 3 deals with the estimation of an
augmented version of this model for the Japanese economy. Section 4 evaluates how the
labor demand and labor supply determinants have contributed to shape the unemployment
rate trajectory in the fading 1990s. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical underpinnings
The benchmark for our analysis is the Chain Reaction theory of unemployment: an inter-
active dynamics approach that relies on dynamic multi-equations models to study the labor
market. A stylized model representative of this approach would be:
nt = α1nt−1 + β1prt − γ1wt, (1)
lt = α2lt−1 + β2zt + γ2wt, (2)
where n denotes employment, l the labor force, pr labor productivity, w real wages, and z
is working-age population. The autoregressive parameters are 0 < α1, α2 < 1, while the β’s
and the γ’s are positive constants. All variables are in logs; constant and error terms are
ignored for ease of exposition; and real wages, productivity, and working-age population are
assumed to be growing variables with growth rates that stabilize in the long-run. Because
l and n are defined in logs, the unemployment rate, u, is approximated by
ut ' lt − nt. (3)
Microfoundations for this sort of model are provided in Karanassou et al. (2007). Most
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important for our analysis is that this simple model allows a clear distinction with com-
peting views of the labor market that, like the Structuralist and Institutionalist theories,
rely on reduced-form unemployment models (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Phelps and
Zoega, 2001; or Nickell et al., 2005). In particular, because all variables in the labor demand
and labor force equations (1)-(2) are I (1), they need to cointegrate to match the unemploy-
ment rate stationary behavior. The cointegrating vectors implied by equations (1)-(2) are³
1 −β1
1−α1
γ1
1−α1
´
and
³
1 −β2
1−α2
−γ2
1−α2
´
. Of course, when we turn to the estimation of
such equations the econometric methodology is chosen according to this characterization of
the labor market.
2.1 The reduced-form unemployment rate equation
Let us rewrite equations (1)-(2) as
(1− α1B)nt = +β1prt − γ1wt, (4)
(1− α2B) lt = β2zt + γ2wt, (5)
where B is the backshift operator. Multiplying both sides of equations (1) and (2) by,
respectively, (1− α2B) and (1− α1B), and using definition (3), we obtain the reduced-form
unemployment rate equation:3
ut = (α1 + α2)ut−1 − α1α2ut−2 + β2zt − α1β2zt−1 − β1prt + β1α2prt−1
+(γ1 + γ2)wt − (α1γ2 + α2γ1)wt−1 (6)
Observe that growing variables enter the reduced-form equation regardless of their non-
stationarity. While the unemployment rate is usually I (0), explanatory variables can be
either I (0) or I (1). This is in contrast to the Structuralist and Institutionalist theories,
and their focus on non-growing variables such as institutions. Institutional variables play a
role in the CRT framework, though it turns out smaller than in mainstream theories. Pre-
vious studies from the CRT, instead, highlight the relative importance of growth drivers.
Particularly, capital accumulation, productivity, and demographics can add to an improved
explanation of the unemployment rate and its dynamics through time (see Karanassou, Sala
and Salvador, 2007, and the references therein provided).4
3This results from
(1− α1B) (1− α2B)ut = β2 (1− α1B) zt − β1 (1− α2B) prt + [γ2 (1− α1B) + γ1 (1− α2B)]wt.
4Furthermore, it is important to note that the CRT provides precise tools for the evaluation of the shocks
and their impact. And not only of temporary shocks, as it is commonly done, but also of persistent and
permanent shocks. See Karanassou et al. (2006).
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2.2 The long-run unemployment rate
Let us now rewrite equations (1)-(2) in their long-run solution forms:5
nLRt =
β1
1− α1
prLRt −
γ1
1− α1
wLRt −
α1
(1− α1)
∆nLR, (7)
lLRt =
β2
1− α2
zLRt +
γ2
1− α2
wLRt −
α2
(1− α2)
∆lLR. (8)
Note that the variables maintain the subscript t, despite being a long-run solution (indicated
by the superscript LR). The reason is the non-zero long-run growth rates of the exogenous
variables, which we have plausibly assumed to be growing variables. In other words, both
the labor demand and the labor force grow at a constant rate in the long-run.
In the long-run, the unemployment rate definition (3) becomes uLRt = l
LR
t − nLRt and
yields:
uLRt =
∙
β2
1− α2
zLRt −
β1
1− α1
prLRt +
(1− α1) γ2 + (1− α2) γ1
(1− α1) (1− α2)
wLRt
¸
+
∙
α1
(1− α1)
∆nLR − α2
(1− α2)
∆lLR
¸
(9)
It follows that the stability of the unemployment rate in the long-run, ∆uLR = 0, is achieved
only when the labor demand and the labor force grow at the same rate, which we call g.
Using again equations (7)-(8), the condition that ∆lLR = ∆nLR = g can be expressed as
β1
1− α1
∆prLR =
β2
1− α2
∆zLR +
(1− α1) γ2 − (1− α2) γ1
(1− α1) (1− α2)
∆wLRt = g.
Further, under this condition equation (9) becomes:
uLRt =
∙
β2
1− α2
zLRt +
(1− α1) γ2 + (1− α2) γ1
(1− α1) (1− α2)
wLRt −
β1
1− α1
prLRt
¸
+
∙
α1 − α2
(1− α1) (1− α2)
g
¸
.
(10)
The first term in brackets is the natural rate of unemployment (NRU); that is, the equi-
librium unemployment rate that would be achieved in the absence of growth (g = 0). A
strong implication drawn from the mainstream labor market theories is that in the long-run
the unemployment rate equals the NRU. This is the main outcome of the standard analysis
conducted via single-equation reduced-form unemployment models, where only stationary
variables are considered. The NRU is thus an attractor or, in other words, the rate to which
5To see it more clearly, depart for the simplest dynamic equation yt = αyt−1 + γxt + εt. To derive the
long-run solution it is convenient to rewrite it as yt =
γ
1−αxt −
α
1−α∆yt +
1
1−αεt. The long-run equilibrium
is generally obtained by the unconditional expectation of the dynamic equation E (yt) =
γ
1−αE (xt) −
α
1−αE (∆yt) or, equivalently, y
LR
t =
γ
1−αx
LR
t − α1−α∆yLR. See Karanassou et al. (2006), Section 2, for a
full analysis on this issue.
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the actual rate of unemployment converges in the long-run.
On the contrary, when growing variables are allowed to play a role in the labor market
(capital accumulation, productivity, or working-age population, for example), the phenom-
enon of frictional growth emerges. This is captured by the second term in brackets, which
shows that frictional growth arises from the interaction between the lagged adjustment
processes in labor demand and labor supply decisions (captured by α1 and α2) and growth
(g). Therefore, frictional growth requires two realistic conditions: the presence of adjustment
costs in firms and households’ activities, and economic growth.6
Frictional growth is thus a crucial concept because it diminishes the role of the NRU
granted by mainstream theories. The more sluggish is the labor market (i.e., the more costly
the adjustments are) and the faster economic growth, the further the NRU lags behind the
long-run unemployment rate. This is the reason why the NRU cannot be seen any more as an
attractor of actual unemployment, and thus ceases to be of paramount importance. It is in
this context that the CRT approach advocates the estimation of the dynamic contributions
of the exogenous variables to the evolution of unemployment. This is the task we undertake
below, after the presentation of the estimated Japanese labor market model.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and econometric methodology
Our database contains data from various sources such as the OECD Economic Outlook, the
IMF International Financial Statistics, and the Ministry of Finance of Japan. In table 1 we
define the variables entering the chosen specification of the equations.7
With respect to the econometric strategy, the need to deal with I (0) and I (1) vari-
ables leads us to follow the Autoregressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) or Bounds testing
approach, developed in Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et. al. (2001). Two are the
main features of this approach. First, it yields consistent estimates both in the short- and
long-run and constitutes an alternative procedure to the standard cointegration techniques.
Second, as shown in Pesaran and Shin (1999), the ARDL can be reliably used in small
samples to estimate and test hypotheses on the long-run coeﬃcients in both cases where
6Frictional growth has other important implications. For example, the very common compartmentaliza-
tion between labor economics (with no growing variables considered) and economic growth (with no role for
the labor market) no longer holds. Moreover, the compartmentalization within labor economics in terms of
the structural and the business cycle components of unemployment (the NRU being the structural compo-
nent) is also ruled out. These and other features of the CRT approach are explained in depth in Karanassou
et al. (2006 and 2007) and in some related references provided therein.
7We have worked with some other variables such as prices, capital stock, financial wealth, oil prices, real
balances, other demand-side variables (such as private consumption or foreign demand), and other variables
related to the tax system (such as social security contributions, direct taxes on households, indirect taxes,
a measure of fiscal pressure, and the fiscal wedge).
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the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0). This is important because the ARDL approach
avoids the pretesting problem implicitly involved in the cointegration analysis of long-run
relationships. The standard cointegration techniques are Johansen’s maximum likelihood
method and the Phillips-Hansen’s procedure. Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the ARDL
is “directly comparable to the semi-parametric, fully-modified OLS approach of Phillips and
Hansen (1990) to estimation of cointegrating relations”. When they undertake this compar-
ison they find that the Phillips and Hansen’s estimator is outperformed by the ARDL-based
estimator, specially when having a relatively small sample period of analysis as ours. In
particular, Pesaran and Shin show that, using the delta method or the Bewley’s approach,
valid standard errors can be computed for the estimated long-run coeﬃcients. It is also im-
portant to note that the estimated ARDL equations can be reparameterized and expressed
in terms of an error correction term (ECM) which, on its own, indicates cointegration of the
variables in case of being negatively signed and significant.8
Table 1: Definitions of variables
Source:
n : total employment (log) (1)
l : total labor force (log) (1)
u : unemployment rate (= l − n) (1)
w : total real compensation per employee (log) (1)
pr : real labor productivity
³
= GDPtotal employment
´
(1)
τ f : direct taxes on business (% of GDP) (1)
g : government expenditures (% of GDP) (1)
gd : government debt (% of GDP) (1)
r : real long-term interest rate (1)
fi : firms’ long-term indebtedness
¡
= long-term borrowings and bondsassets
¢
(2)
d97 : dummy (value 0 up to 1997, 1 afterwards) (1)
udt : ut ∗ d97
z : working-age population (1)
∆ = Diﬀerence operator
Sources: (1): OECD, Economic Outlook; (2) Ministry of Finance of Japan.
We thus follow the ARDL approach to determine the concrete specifications of the
labor demand and supply equations, and ensure that they pass the standard battery of
misspecification and structural stability tests.9 The best specifications are selected on the
basis of the standard selection criteria (Akaike and Schwarz Bayesian) and re-estimated as
a system by 3SLS, so the estimates are safe from endogeneity and cross-equation correlation
8More details on the empirical application of this econometric methodology can be found in Karanassou,
Sala and Salvador (2007) and Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2008).
9These are: A Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation (SC), Ramsey’s linearity test (LIN), plus
heteroskedasticity (HET ) and conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) tests, all distributed as χ2 (1). We
also check if the residuals are normally distributed, in this case as χ2 (2), and ensure, by means of the
Cusum and Cusum2 tests, that the estimated equations are structurally stable.
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problems. These are the estimates presented in table 2. Table 3 displays information on the
implied ECM term and the corresponding cointegrating vectors (CV s). These are compared
with the CV s that would be obtained using the Johansen framework to show that the long-
run relationships between growing variables we estimate are not spurious.
3.2 Estimated equations
The labor demand equation is characterized by a large persistence coeﬃcient (0.89), indi-
cating strong inertia in firms’ aggregate level of employment. Wages exert the expected
negative influence with a short-run elasticity of -0.04 and a long-run one of -0.37
¡
= −0.04
1−0.89
¢
.
This implies that a 1% rise in this variable would reduce labor demand by 0.37%. The pos-
itive influence of labor productivity, outlined as a crucial variable in Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), is also consistent with the theory, with short and long-run coeﬃcients, respectively,
of 0.10 and 0.91. Also as expected, direct taxation on firms’ benefits exerts a negative
influence on employment. Given the definition of this variable, the estimated coeﬃcient
needs to be interpreted as a semielasticity indicating that a 1 percentage point (p.p.) rise
in this variable would decrease employment by 0.1 p.p. in the short-run and 0.8 p.p. in the
long-run.
Table 2: Labor demand and labor supply. Japan, 1972-2006
Estimation method: 3SLS
Dependent variable: nt Dependent variable: lt
coef. [probs.] coef. [probs.]
c 2.26 [0.000] c -0.59 [0.000]
nt−1 0.89 [0.000] lt−1 0.86 [0.000] Misspecification tests
wt -0.04 [0.000] ∆lt−1 -0.27 [0.038] SC[χ2 (1)] 0.08 [0.775] 1.00 [0.316]
prt 0.10 [0.067] wt 0.05 [0.012] LIN[χ2 (1)] 1.16 [0.281] 0.07 [0.786]
τ ft−1 -0.09 [0.099] rt−1 0.10 [0.000] NOR[χ
2 (2)] 0.83 [0.661] 5.04 [0.080]
gt−1 0.06 [0.095] ut -1.20 [0.000] HET[χ2 (1)] 2.03 [0.154] 1.75 [0.186]
gdt -0.01 [0.000] ud97t 0.35 [0.001] ARCH[χ
2 (1)] 2.49 [0.114] 0.00 [0.949]
fit−1 -0.07 [0.000] Zt 0.14 [ * ]
∆lt 0.98 [0.000] Stability tests (5% signif.)
Cusum X X
s.e. 0.001 s.e. 0.004 Cusum2 X X
s.e.: standard error of regression; 5% critical values: χ2(1) = 3.84; χ2(2) = 5.99.
(*) restricted coeﬃcient so that the long-run elasticity of l with respect to z is unity.
Beyond the standard Keynesian framework of analysis, one of Phelps’ (1994) contribu-
tions was the consideration of government expenditures and public debt as relevant deter-
minants of the labor market performance. We include these two variables on account of the
close connection of the public sector in Japan with firms and financial institutions. While
government expenditures (g) display a positive coeﬃcient (0.06 in the short-run and 0.54
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in the long-run), it is important to note the negative incidence of government debt (gd) on
employment (-0.01 and -0.09, respectively). None of these signs come as surprising. The
first one captures the direct impact of a Keynesian expansion via public consumption and
public investment,10 while the second one controls for the Japanese "burden of the debt"
and the implied opportunity cost for the private sector.
More precisely, the sign of the coeﬃcient of government debt accounts for the implied
layoﬀs that more ineﬃcient and "subsidized" firms have to incur to keep working. At the
same time, new and productive firms are prevented to gain market share (or even enter the
market) due to the supportive actions endorsed by the government towards banks which, in
turn, preserve ineﬃcient firms through bad loan practices. In short, this coeﬃcient captures
both job destruction and new job opportunities that fail to open due to ineﬃciencies that
arise from a noncompetitive outcome. A traceable link that goes from government to banks
in the form of large bailouts, and from banks to troubled companies through bad loans, has
been at the center stage of Japanese postwar development. In recent times the impact of the
debt on the economy has aroused interest (see Barseghyan, 2006a and 2006b, for instance), as
also has the eﬀect of ineﬃcient firms on employment (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005, Caballero
et al., 2006). The existence of such firms, it is argued, prevents the competitive outcome
from becoming a realizable fact.
Along with the government debt, firms’ indebtedness (fi) is yet another variable relevant
to firms’ labor demand decisions in Japan. Massive debt outstanding in the corporate sector
and bad loans in the banking sector are two sides of the same coin. The incidence of fi
in the labor market has been studied in Ogawa (2003) to evaluate the consequences of
financial distress on employment. In our macro model this variable is also significant with
a short-run semielasticity of -0.07 (-0.64 in the long-run). Ogawa (2003) explains up to
four channels whereby this variable should aﬀect negatively the labor demand and provides
evidence for a sample of Japanese firms in the 1990s. First, the higher cost of external
finance to over-burdened debtors. Second, the diﬀering interests between managers and
shareholders when faced with bankruptcy, that make the former to cut back on labor and
investment in order to raise eﬃciency (a disciplinary role of the debt). Third, the decrease in
investment that might occur with debt overhang (this often happens when, having borrowed
in foreign currency, the country is faced with a depreciation). And fourth, the eﬀects of bad
loans for banks, which can raise the cost of external finance (for banks) and thus restrain
their lending capacity.
Finally, the change in the available labor supply for firms (∆l) provides a source of
interactions between the two estimated equations (the presence of the unemployment rate
10Of course, government expenditures and direct taxes on firms are related to the government debt.
Nevertheless, the explosion in the latter and its magnitude during a substantial part of the sample period,
have little to do with the evolution of the first two variables. As will become clear subsequently, these
variables capture very diﬀerent phenomena.
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in the labor force equation is the other source). In Karanassou et al. (2008), the role of ∆l in
the labor demand equation is rationalized as a matching eﬀect. As Coles and Smith (1996)
show, firms search primarily for new job applicants so that job matches depend more on new
entrants to the labor force than on the level of the labor force. Thus the greater the number
of new applicants, the greater the consequent number of matches. The coeﬃcient of 0.98
implies that a 1% rise in ∆l is almost fully translated into employment gains. Nevertheless,
because it is a diﬀerence this variable does not entail a long-run elasticity of employment
with respect to the labor force.
The labor force equation is standard. As in the labor demand equation, the adjustment
coeﬃcient is large (0.86) and indicates strong persistence in aggregate household’s labor
supply decisions. Real wages and real interest rates exert the expected positive influence
with long-run coeﬃcients, respectively, of 0.36 and 0.71. The higher the wage, the more the
incentives to participate in the labor market due to the relative prices of leisure and work.
In turn, higher interest rates force the households to supply a larger amount of labor because
of increasing credit constraints. Note that in both cases the indirect eﬀect on unemployment
is the expected positive one.
Unemployment discourages the labor force, but less so after 1997 as indicated by ud97,
which is included to solve the structural stability problems of the estimated coeﬃcients (note
that from 1997 the coeﬃcient of u is -0.85=-1.20+0.35). The higher the unemployment
rate, the less people searching actively for a job and the lower the sensitiveness of the
labor force to the growing unemployment problem. This change in 1997 reflects the sudden
stabilization in the participation rate, indicative of the growing amount of discouraged
workers. Finally, working-age population is the labor supply driving-force. It captures the
important demographic influences on the labor market with a unit long-run elasticity not
rejected by the data.
3.3 Model diagnosis
To further check the validity of the estimated model we use the Johansen procedure to
confirm that our long-run relationships comprise indeed cointegrating vectors (see Table 3).
First, the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics indicate that the variables involved in the
equations are cointegrated. Second, we estimate a VAR featuring the main characteristics
of the estimated equations (same order, same sample period and variables, and inclusion of
unrestricted intercepts and no trends) and obtain the cointegrating vectors (CV s). Third,
we test whether the long-run relationships implied by our model conform with the ones
obtained using Johansen’s method. It is a likelihood ratio (LR) test, distributed as a χ2 (.),
that restricts Johansen’s CVs to take the corresponding ARDL values.11 These restrictions
11The I (1) variables in the model are n, w, pr and z. Therefore, we test two restrictions in each equation
(note that this test is conducted on the unrestricted estimate of the labor supply equation). For the sake of
10
are not rejected at conventional critical values, a result that adds to the negative and
significant sign of the ECM term in both equations.
Table 3: Validity of the long-run relationships
ARDL Johansen LR test
ecmt−1 CV
[E1]
¡
n w pr
¢ ¡
n w pr
¢
-0.11[0.000]
¡
1.0 0.37 −91
¢
1
¡
1.0 0.42 −0.90
¢
3.74 [0.154]
[E2]
¡
l w z
¢ ¡
l w z
¢
-0.15[0.004]
¡
1 −0.28 −1.18
¢
1
¡
1 −0.05 −1.35
¢
4.09 [0.130]
CV = number of cointegrated vectors; 5% critical values for the LM test: χ2 (2) = 5.99.
Finally, as shown in figure 1, it is important to note that our model tracks closely the
actual evolution of unemployment, despite being computed from a multi-equation model
with various sources of interactions across equations and not directly estimated. This figure
is also interesting because it depicts the magnitude of the unemployment problem that came
with the fading 1990s. Our next objective is to use this model to shed some light on the
causes that made the unemployment path unusually higher in those years.
1
2
3
4
5
6
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Actual
Fitted
Figure 1. Actual and fitted values
The fading 1990s:
   1990-2002
brevity we just present the final results of this exercise. Underlying this table there is sizable information,
which is available upon request. In particular, that of the unit root tests and the whole cointegration
analysis using Johansen’s method.
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4 Dynamic contributions: The 1990s at a glance
To what extent this trajectory would have changed had a particular variable followed a
diﬀerent path? We conduct dynamic simulations that aim at disentangling the relative
contribution of the model’s explanatory variables to this rising path. For example, if direct
taxes on firms had stayed at its 1990 value, 5.6% of GDP, instead of falling to 2.9% in
2002, it is interesting to ask how the rate of unemployment would have evolved. This is a
simple, transparent, and informative way to analyze the driving forces behind the upward
trajectory of Japanese unemployment in those years. By no means, however, this should
be taken as an assessment of what would have actually happened had this or that variable
behaved diﬀerently than it actually did (in which case we would run afoul of the Lucas
Critique).
The actual and simulated evolution of each exogenous variable, and the corresponding
actual and simulated evolution of the unemployment rate, are plotted in the Appendix
(figures A1 and A2, respectively). The information contained in these figures is summarized
in table 4. Figure 2 presents the evolution of unemployment when all explanatory variables
are simultaneously fixed at their 1990 values. Observe that in such scenario unemployment
would have declined slightly to 1.5% in 2002, a value representative of the period before the
oil price shocks. Instead, it reached an historical maximum of 5.5%.
1
2
3
4
5
6
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Figure 2. Unemployment effects of the exogenous variables
Actual trajectory
Simulated
(All exogenous variables
kept at their 1990 value)
2.1%
5.5%
1.5%
According to our simulations the rise in unemployment was not a ‘labor market problem’.
Mainstream accounts of the labor market performance emphasize the role of wage-push fac-
tors, in particular of labor market institutions, that generate real wage rigidities and hamper
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adjustments in the demand and supply of labor. In Japan, on the contrary, the decreasing
growth rate of real wages was the most important oﬀsetting force (by 1.6 percentage points)
of the unusual unemployment rise in the 1990s. Reasonably, this coincided with a strong
and continuous decline in the rate of organization of labor unions and the noticeable reduc-
tion in the workweek length (average hours worked per week). According to the 2006 Basic
Survey on Labour Unions provided by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the
organization rate of unions came down from 25% in 1990 to 20% in 2002. The labor market
is notably heading towards a strong deunionization in recent times. On the other hand, the
new workweek length set by the revision of the Labor Standards Law in 1988 brought the
amount of hours down from 44 to 40 during the period 1988-1993. More, average annual
hours worked dropped from 2000 to 1800 for the period 1990-2002 (OECD, 2007).
The major cause behind the sudden increase in unemployment was the sharp decline in
productivity growth, which considered alone accounts for a 5 percentage points rise in the
unemployment rate. In the absence of such a decline, unemployment would have remained
at levels below 1% during most of the 1990s. Hence, our model allows us to rationalize the
steep rise in unemployment during the "lost decade" mainly as productivity-led.
This result is in accordance with several recent studies relying in productivity slowdown
as the major cause for the recent stagnation in Japan. Hayashi and Prescott (2002), for
example, believe the 1990s can be explained as a low productivity growth problem alone.
Since the financial system did not break down, they argue a neoclassical growth model might
well account for the Japanese lost decade of growth. Fukao and Kwon (2006), in turn, stress
the lack of ability for the private sector to reallocate resources from less eﬃcient to more
eﬃcient firms. This "low metabolism", they argue, seems to be an important cause for the
productivity slowdown in the lost decade. Finally, Miyagawa et al. (2006), in studying
the pro-cyclicality of measured productivity, conclude that policies to revive the Japanese
economy should focus on promoting productivity growth.
There are diﬀerent hypotheses that explain the sharp decline of productivity growth in
Japan. First, the end of Japan’s catching up process has led capital accumulation, labor
reallocation, and investment in human capital to cease being the prime sources of growth
(see Kim and Lau, 1994 and 1996). This has allowed productivity to become the real growth
driver until recent times, when Japan arguably reached a first-class membership in the in-
dustrialized world. The problem with this argument is that a decade of slump almost surely
cannot be explained by growth theory alone. Japan has not only stopped catching up, but
has also lost considerable ground relative to industrial leaders. Further, growth theory
restraints itself from explaining frictions in financial intermediation, something we try to
grasp with the inclusion of firms’ indebtedness in the labor demand equation. Second, the
overinvestment process that took place in the 1980s due to overrated asset and land prices
could have translated into a productivity slowdown after the bubble burst on the last day
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of 1989. Third, the crowding out of capital exerted by persistent increases in government
debt has brought down the rate of return on capital, leading to a decline in investment and
productivity growth rates (Barseghyan, 2006a). Finally, the "zombie firms" hypothesis has
been laid out to help understand the relation between Japanese banks and their borrowers.
It suggests that ineﬃcient insolvent borrowers (the "zombies") have benefited from poor
banking practices and, therefore, have prevented more productive companies from gain-
ing market share. This, consequently, has shut down an important source of productivity
gains for the economy (Ahearne and Shinada, 2005), since the competitive outcome where
"zombies" lay oﬀ workers and lose market share is frustrated (Caballero et al., 2006; and
Kobayashi, 2007).
Table 4: Variable changes and unemployment eﬀects12
u ∆w ∆pr τ f g gd fd r ∆z
Actual values:
1990 2.1 2.2 3.1 5.6 20.5 68.6 24.1 4.6 0.5
2002∗ 5.5 0.4 1.0 2.9 24.0 153.6 25.9 2.8 0.0
Diﬀerence∗∗ 3.4 -1.8 -2.1 -2.7 3.5 85.0 1.8 -1.8 -0.5
Contributions to unemployment (percentage points):
∆u - -1.6 5.1 -0.4 -0.4 2.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.5
Magnitude of complementarities/substitutabilities (percentage points):
Total contributions (sum of individual contributions) 4.6
Joint contributions (all variables kept at their 1990 value) 4.0
Magnitude of substitutabilities 0.6
*: For diﬀerences (∆w,∆pr,∆z), average growth in 1991-2002
**: Expressed in percentage points.
The reaction from the government to the fading 1990s is embedded both in the increased
spending as well as in the soaring national debt.13 In our model this reaction is captured
via traditional fiscal policy instruments, such as government expenditures and direct taxes
on firms. Receding real interest rates reflect, accordingly, the expansionary monetary policy
implemented in the 1990s. These three variables contributed together to a 1 percentage
point (p.p.) reduction in unemployment (0.4 p.p. the first two and 0.2 p.p. the latter).
12Total dynamic contributions (sum of individual contributions) amount to 4.6 percentage points, while
joint contributions (that is, when all variables are kept at their 1990 values) amount to 4.0 percentage points
in terms of unemployment. The diﬀerence between those two (0.6) stands for the substitutabilities between
the exogenous variables.
13Whether it was right on time or with some delay remains a disputed matter. Barseghyan (2006b), for
example, claims the Japanese slump in the 1990s was mainly due to the existence of non performing loans
combined with a delay in the government bailout. In other words, the slump could have been subdued had
the government stepped in more rapidly.
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This expansionary eﬀect on the economy, however, was much lower than the distortions
brought about by the huge national debt and the rapid pace it followed. Our simulations
indicate that this rising path accounts for 2.6 percentage points increase in unemployment,
making the debt a significant contributor to the final net increment in unemployment.
The Japanese government is well known for its deep meddling with the private sector
since postwar. It has, for long time, fed a strong alliance with big financial conglomerates
that easily embodied the "culture of harmony" laid out by a deep-rooted Confucian culture.
But whether it be the result of Confucianism or crony capitalism, the Japanese government
indebtedness has gone well beyond the goals of an expansionary fiscal policy, just to deliver
a noncompetitive outcome that harms employment in the end.
The cumulative debt appears, thus, as a burden and not as the result of some specific
expansionary fiscal policy, which in our model is captured via the traditional fiscal policy
channels (government expenditures and the tax system). The fact that government spending
has barely budged (in the range of 20% to 24% of GDP since 1970) while gross government
debt reached the astounding amount of 180% in 2006 at a pace of 7% growth for the previous
ten years, provides a first rough indication of this burden.14 It is hard to think the debt
burden would leave the labor market unaﬀected. Particularly, in what refers to creation
of new and more eﬃcient firms (and, therefore, employment) that would have turned up if
the extinction of most ineﬃcient ones had not been prevented through government bailout.
This fact comes at a substantial opportunity cost, in terms of job creation, and adds up to
the already harming eﬀect of ineﬃcient firms laying oﬀ workers to remain competitive.
Of course, this is not to say that the government debt should not be seen as a plausible
(and sometimes powerful) Keynesian tool for reactivation; quite the contrary, it should be
seen as such when strictly used as a short-run Keynesian device. Many doubt, however,
about the eﬀectiveness of fiscal policy in Japan during the 1990s (Krugman, 1998; Ihori et
al., 2003; Hamada, 2004). Besides, banks, conglomerates, and government have formed up
a tightly intertwined network characterized by an uneasy lending-borrowing dynamics. In
fact, Japanese banks own large shares of their corporate borrowers, and thus there is little
financial advantage in corporate debt foreclosure (Fukao, 2003). It seems the government
has somehow diverted useful resources that otherwise had been helpful in supporting new
eﬃcient firms entering the industry.15 Further, since the economy has suﬀered dearly in
terms of productivity growth, it seems as if the bailouts had turned out an unfair reward
to a less eﬃcient private sector. In fact, one is left to wonder if the aggressive bailing out
14Indeed, excessive bailouts targeting a financial sector already damaged by the bubble crisis were com-
monplace during the mid-1990s. For instance, during 1997 a $232.5 billion bank bailout was introduced to
prop up the financial sector.
15It should also be noted that, since the beginning of industrialization, the national banking regime in
Japan has solely grown to achieve eﬃciency for financing export production. Japanese exporting firms
never had to compete for capital or credit the way their American peers, for instance, used to. Credit is rife
and easy for such firms, and usually at a rate that guarantees their competitiveness in the export market.
Arguably, this is also why Japan is not that well equipped to finance new entrepreneur ventures.
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conducted by the government in the 1990s might have harmed the economy’s productivity
to a greater extent.16
With respect to firm’s financial indebtedness, our simulation shows a null eﬀect. This
is due to the mild increase of this variable in our period of analysis, which is in contrast
to the steep rise it experienced in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. Of course,
this result does not preclude a relevant role of financial distress, specially at the root of the
crisis, but this assessment requires a longer historical perspective than the one taken here.
Rapid aging population is another important issue well deserving the government’s at-
tention in later years, despite its relieving eﬀect on unemployment. Indeed, the growth rate
of working-age population went down in the 1990s, at the same time that the aggregate
participation rate stabilized around 78% in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s.
According to our model this contributed to reduce unemployment by 0.5 percentage points
despite the damaging consequences for future generations. The speed at which the growth
rate of working-age population has been gradually decreasing to reach negative values in last
years posits a true challenge to the maintenance of the welfare system. Alarming figures by
the Statistic Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs show the radical change in the popu-
lation pyramid that it is to be expected in future years. While 1950 presented the standard
broad-based pyramid (35% at the 0-14 years range), the projection for year 2050 delivers an
almost exactly inverted chart (near 40% for 65 years and over). This is an important issue
the country will have to address as it could otherwise lead to labor shortages in the future,
once the unemployment problem is solved. Opening the labor market begins to be seen as
an alternative, considering the registered alien population accounts for only less than 2% of
total population, one of the world’s lowest.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the Japanese labor market from a macroeconomic perspective taking the
Chain Reaction Theory as theoretical benchmark. This choice admits a wider analytical
perspective than the mainstream theories allow for. It permits to go beyond the role of
institutions and consider a set of labor market macroeconomic determinants that have been
found (sometimes in isolation) relevant to explain the 1990s slump. The novelty of our
analysis is to consider these macroeconomic determinants jointly and together with standard
labor market variables, and let them contend to explain the unemployment upsurge in the
fading 1990s.
We find that the steep rise in unemployment during the "lost decade" was essentially
a productivity-led phenomenon. The steep rise in government debt plays also a major role
by supporting ineﬃcient firms which nevertheless incurred in job layoﬀs, and by preventing
16The study of such connection is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
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new job opportunities to emerge. In particular, the low productivity growth rate and the
increasing debt account, respectively, for 5.1 and 2.6 percentage points (p.p.) rise in the
unemployment rate for 1990-2002. These eﬀects are, to some extent, oﬀset by dynamic
contributions going in the opposite direction: (i) real wages, which stand out as the strongest
force (with a contribution of -1.6 p.p.); (ii) expansive fiscal policies (-1.0 p.p.); and (iii)
demographics (-0.5 p.p.). The variable representing the financial distress in the private
sector shows no significant contribution during this period.
Our analysis seems to leave room for the "zombie firms" hypothesis, where less productive
firms prevent new eﬃcient competitors from entering the market. This mechanism entails
a serious opportunity cost in terms of jobs that fail to open, whereas it allows ineﬃcient
firms to keep working and spare unneeded workers. Within this setting "zombie firms"
are indirectly debt-financed through massive government bailout, which aims at keeping
bad loan practices between banks and insolvent borrowers. The result is a noncompetitive
performance of the labor market that aﬀects eﬃciency and, hence, employment.
Japanese authorities have to address the debt problem before it becomes a real deterrent
to growth. In easing this burden in the short run and giving up its role as lender of last
resort for compromised banks, the government might increase eﬃciency and create new job
opportunities that would help the economy back to the right path once again. Such decisions
should come jointly with strong measures boosting productivity. Arguably, not only has
Japan fallen into a liquidity trap, but seems to have stumbled into a low productivity trap
as well.
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Figure A2. Unemployment contributions of the exogenous variables
